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Abstract
Nigeria experienced the Global Financial Crisis as a dramatic decline in the price of crude oil
and a burst stock market bubble. These losses were compounded by a high level of margin
lending, resulting in large numbers of nonperforming loans (NPLs) for Nigerian banks. The
government established the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) in July
2010 to purchase NPLs and inject capital in insolvent banks. In three purchases between
December 2010 and December 2011, AMCON acquired loans with face value ₦4.02 trillion
($26.8 billion) for ₦1.76 trillion. As a result, NPLs in Nigerian banks fell from a peak of 37.2%
to 5.8% within 2 years of the establishment of AMCON. However, AMCON suffered heavy
losses during its debt recovery and recapitalization efforts, and, by 2014, it carried a negative
equity of ₦3.6 trillion. To offset these losses, AMCON created the Banking Sector Resolution
Cost Fund (RCF). AMCON projected this sinking fund to provide the bulk of its revenue,
though it remains unclear as to whether the ₦1.5 trillion RCF could completely cover
AMCON’s losses.
Keywords: AMCON, asset management, Global Financial Crisis, Nigeria, NPLs
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Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON)
At a Glance
During the years leading up to the Global
Financial Crisis, Nigerian banks fueled a
rapid credit expansion to the private
sector. Most notably, banks supplied large
quantities of margin loans and investments
in the oil and gas sector.
The situation became unsustainable as the
financial crisis spread around the globe.
The crash of the domestic stock market in
March 2008 and the rapid decline of oil and
gas prices affected the balance sheets of
many banks in Nigeria, resulting in a high
level of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the
sector. In response, Nigerian authorities set
up the Asset Management Corporation of
Nigeria (AMCON) during the summer of
2010. A public corporation, owned jointly
by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and
the Ministry of Finance, AMCON’s mandate
was to “acquire [NPLs] from [Nigerian]
banks and annex the underlying collateral,
[as well as] fill the remaining capital
deficiency and receive equity and/or
preferred shares in the affected banks as
consideration.” Through a series of three
purchases from December 2010 through
December 2011, AMCON acquired loans
with face value ₦4.02 trillion ($26.8 billion)
for ₦1.76 trillion ($11.7 billion), a 56%
discount.
Summary Evaluation

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: “to stimulate the recovery of the Nigerian
financial system through:
1. providing liquidity to the Intervened Banks and the
non–Intervened Banks
2. providing capital to the Intervened Banks and the
non–Intervened Banks
3. increasing confidence in bank balance sheets
4. increasing access to restructuring/refinancing
opportunities for borrowers”
Launch dates
Announcement:
January 28, 2010
Operational:
July 19, 2010
First transfer:
December 31, 2010
Wind-down dates
Operational as of 2021
Size and Type of NPL
32.8% of loans in 2009;
problem
loans comprised energy
sector debt, margin
loans secured by energy
stocks, mortgages, and
other corporate debt
Program size
Not specified
Eligible institutions
All banks in Nigeria;
Open-bank
Usage
Acquired ₦4.02 trillion
for ₦1.76 trillion ($11.7
billion)
Outcomes
Negative equity of ₦3.6
trillion in 2014
Ownership structure
Public
Notable features
The CBN mandated that
no financial institution
could have more than
5% of their loans
classified
as
assets
eligible for purchase by
AMCON

AMCON’s asset transfer operations
successfully decreased the NPL level in the
Nigerian banking sector. Critics noted issues related to AMCON’s dependence on CBN
guidelines in its decision-making, including purchases, eligible asset selection, and valuation.
The IMF repeatedly questioned AMCON’s lack of an explicit exit strategy and its continued
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purchases of distressed assets years after the Global Financial Crisis, while acknowledging
the agency’s contributions to the rapid decline in NPLs. Through loan acquisitions and bank
recapitalizations, the agency accumulated a negative equity position of ₦3.6 trillion by the
end of 2014. During the following year, AMCON’s CEO announced that the corporation had
resolved 57% of the acquired loans, recovering a total of ₦1 trillion. AMCON continued to
pose a financial burden on the government in 2020.
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Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria: Nigeria Context
GDP
$291.9 billion in 2009
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$361.5 billion in 2010
GDP per capita
$1,891 in 2009
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$2,280 in 2010
Data for 2009:
S&P: B+
Fitch: BB
Moody’s: Not available
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt)
Data for 2010:
S&P: B+
Fitch: BB
Moody’s: Not available
Size of banking system
$72.2 billion in 2009
$79.0 billion in 2010
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
25% of 2009 GDP
22% of 2010 GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
Data not available in 2009
financial system
Data not available in 2010
Five-bank concentration of banking system
81.7% in 2009
66.5% in 2010
Foreign involvement in banking system
5.0% in 2009
14.0% in 2010
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available in 2009
Data not available in 2010
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes in 2009
Up to $3,328 via Nigeria
Deposit Insurance
Corporation in 2010
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Overview

Background
In the early 2000s, the Nigerian banking sector underwent major structural reforms. In 2004,
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced a plan to strengthen the country’s fragmented
financial sector through consolidation (Alford 2010). The CBN justified the policy with the
need to “grow the banks and position them to play pivotal roles in driving development
across the sectors of the economy” (Sanusi 2011). The CBN mandated that all banks increase
their paid-up capital from ₦2 billion ($13 million) to ₦25 billion ($166 million).4 The policy
was announced just one month after Charles Soluda took office as the new Governor of the
CBN in June 2004. Banks had until December 2005, a period of roughly 18 months, to reach
the new minimum required capital (Alford 2010). The announcement forced several
mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector. Of the 89 licensed privately owned banks
active in Nigeria in 2005, 25 emerged. Ultimately, the CBN revoked the licenses of 13 banks
due to their inability to reach the mandated capital level in time (Osuji 2012).
Following the consolidation, Nigerian banks fueled a rapid credit expansion to the private
sector. Banks invested most of the funds in the country’s natural resources sector and in
margin loans for the purchase of domestic stocks, making them increasingly exposed to oil
and stock prices (Cerruti and Neyens 2016, 115; Makanjuola 2015). The expansion of margin
lending fueled a five-fold increase in the total capitalization of the Nigerian stock market
between 2004 and 2007 (Osuji 2012, 149; Makanjuola 2015). The domestic all-shares index
reached its high of 66,162 points on March 3, 2008, and then fell 70% in the following 12
months (Nigerian Stock Exchange 1996–2021). Oil prices tanked as the Global Financial
Crisis reduced demand around the globe. The combined oil and equity price shocks affected
the balance sheets of many banks in Nigeria and led to a rapid increase in nonperforming
loans to margin investors and oil companies (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). (See Figure 1.)

The exchange rate used throughout—₦150 for US$1—is the average exchange rate between 2009 and 2011
using annual data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
4
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Figure 1: Nonperforming Loans in Nigeria (% of total loans)

Source: Makanjuola 2015.
Policymakers became aware of the magnitude of the problems facing the Nigerian financial
sector through a special examination of the banking sector conducted jointly by the Nigeria
Deposit Insurance Company (NDIC) and the CBN in June 2009 (CBN 2010). The report
revealed 10 banks to be either undercapitalized or insolvent (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The
report also highlighted the banks’ “excessive risk-taking and ineffective risk management,
weak internal control mechanisms, undue focus on short-term gains, lack of Board and
management capacity, conflicts of interest, and excessive executive compensation”
(Makanjuola 2016). The CBN intervened, quickly and decisively, following the outcome of
the examination. It replaced the executives of eight banks and injected ₦620 billion ($1.4
billion) in Tier 2 capital in the form of unsecured subordinated debt. The central bank also
guaranteed all interbank loans until December 2011 (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
As a result of the additional provisioning that regulators required banks to make following
the special examination, reported NPLs in the industry increased from 6.3 percent to 32.8
percent between December 2008 and December 2009 (CBN 2010). In 2010, the Nigerian
authorities decided to establish a new agency to address the growing NPL problem and to
perform further capital injections, instead of following the established route by winding
down failed banks through the NDIC. The decision stemmed from the absence of a rapidly
available mechanism to inject public funds beyond the CBN package and from legal
challenges to the NDIC’s resolution authority (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The Asset
Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) Act established AMCON as Nigeria’s public
asset management company. The Act mandated that AMCON purchase nonperforming and
systemically important loans and inject capital into banks (Makanjuola 2015).
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Program Description
The AMCON Act was approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate and signed
into law on July 19, 2010 (Cerruti and Neyens 2016, 116; Makanjuola 2015). The Governor
of the CBN had previously proposed the idea of a public asset management corporation in
Nigeria in 2004 as a part of the banking reform package. Although an initial draft of the
AMCON Act was forwarded to the Senate at that time, the proposal encountered strong
resistance from opponents of the banking consolidation agenda and was abandoned. The
context was different when the AMCON Act was presented to the National Assembly in 2010.
Given the difficulties facing the banking system and the lack of appropriate government
mechanisms to absorb the system’s NPLs and mobilize funds for recapitalizations, legislators
had a new sense of urgency that facilitated a rapid enactment of the law. AMCON was
established as a “resolution and recapitalization vehicle” mandated “to acquire [NPLs] from
the banks and annex the underlying collateral . . . fill the remaining capital deficiency and
receive equity and/or preferred shares in the affected banks as consideration.”
After the legislature approved the legislation, the CBN set up the AMCON Implementation
Committee (AMCON-IC; Makanjuola 2015). The committee met on six occasions between
May and August 2010 to draft a work plan for AMCON and ensure it could properly execute
its mandate once fully established. The AMCON-IC was separated into several groups, each
in charge of different aspects of the implementation process.5 Up to 30 participants attended.
The committee’s last meeting took place on August 18, 2010, leading AMCON to start its
operations with offices in Lagos and Abuja and total staff strength of 184. The newly
established agency was governed by a 10-member board of directors. The Nigerian Senate
approved the board, consisting of four executive directors and six non-executive members,
on November 3, 2010. Mustafa Chike-Obi6 was elected as CEO and head of the board.
Members of the board were nominated by the Federal Ministry of Finance, the NDIC, and the
CBN. AMCON was fully owned by the Nigerian government, with authorized capital of ₦10
billion contributed in equal parts by the CBN and Ministry of Finance.
The AMCON Act provided guidelines on governance and transparency. Regarding
governance, the document establishes guidelines related to board members’ experience and
potential conflicts of interest. Transparency was provided through annual reports to be
submitted to the Ministry of Finance and the CBN, as well as quarterly reports to the
legislature. The agency’s accounts were to be published yearly (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
However, the AMCON Act provided no financial guardrails to limit the taxpayers’ exposure.
“There [were] no provisions to limit the amount of assets or equity that AMCON may
purchase or the bonds to be issued, no leverage ratio, and no requirement to maintain a
minimum amount of equity.” AMCON was thinly capitalized, with paid-in capital of ₦10
billion for asset acquisitions and recapitalizations totaling ₦4 trillion (Cerruti and Neyens
5 There

were nine subcommittees, which included: (i) Waivers and Forbearances; (ii) Back-up Plan; (iii) IT and
Processes; (iv) Business Plan; (v) Valuations and Transfers; (vi) Logistics and Procurement; (vii) Recruitment;
(viii) Funding and Bonds; (ix) Legal and Accounting (Makanjuola 2015).
6 Mustafa Chike-Obi previously held senior positions at various Wall Street firms, including Goldman Sachs and
Guggenheim Partners (Makanjuola 2015).
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2016). Since AMCON used zero-coupon bonds to acquire loans, it did not pay interest until
the bonds expired at the end of 2013 and 2014. However, AMCON ultimately refinanced
some of the face value of those bonds when they expired, amounting to ₦5.5 trillion,
compared to the ₦3.9 trillion valuation of the bonds at issuance.
AMCON was set up to reduce the NPL level in the financial system (“Asset Management
Corporation of Nigeria Guidelines No.1” 2010, para. 4; hereafter “AMCON Guidelines”). As
the agency’s supervisory authority, the CBN played a critical role in devising the necessary
incentives for banks to participate in the NPL purchase program. In the guidelines laid out
for AMCON, the CBN mandated that within three months of the guidelines’ coming into force
on November 15, 2010, no financial institution could have more than 5% of their loans
classified as assets eligible for purchase by AMCON (AMCON Guidelines; Cerruti and Neyens
2016). This forced institutions in need of capital to quickly address their NPL problem. Per
the AMCON Act, the agency could acquire any asset designated as eligible under the CBN
guidelines. The guidelines defined a broad set of assets as eligible but focused on
nonperforming assets or loans classified as substandard and below (AMCON Act). Similarly,
the CBN guidelines specified valuation methodologies for acquired assets based on collateral
type and required that unsecured loans were to be valued at 5 percent of face value (AMCON
Guidelines).
Additional funding for AMCON’s operations was secured through the establishment of the
Banking Sector Resolution Cost Fund (RCF) in the amount of ₦1.5 trillion (Makanjuola 2015).
Funds were to be collected over a 10-year period, with the CBN contributing ₦500 billion
and Nigerian banks ₦1 trillion. CBN contributions were fixed at ₦50 billion annually while
banks would contribute “an annual levy equivalent to 0.3 percent of their assets, which is
expected to generate ₦100 billion per year.” This contribution was later increased to 0.5%
to secure sufficient funding for the RCF (Onu 2013). To assist banks in financing this levy,
the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation had the ability to decrease the insurance
premium it charged banks (Makanjuola 2015).
Outcomes
As a result of the CBN guidelines requiring banks to shed nonperforming assets, every bank
in Nigeria except for two foreign-owned institutions—Citigroup and Standard Chartered
Bank—participated in asset sales. The first transaction occurred on December 31, 2010, with
the purchase of loans with face value ₦2.46 trillion for ₦866.2 billion, a 65% discount. In this
first transaction, all transferred loans came from banking-sector margin lending practices.
Subsequent purchases of non-margin NPLs and systemically important loans occurred on
April 6, 2011, and December 28, 2011, respectively. In total, AMCON acquired loans with face
value ₦4.02 trillion at an average discount rate of 56.2%, paying ₦1.76 trillion for the loans.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the three transfers (Makanjuola 2015).
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Figure 2: AMCON Loan Acquisition from Participating Financial Institutions
Face value

Amount paid

(₦ billions)

(₦ billions)

2,460

866

64.7%

4/6/2011

675

378

44.0%

Margin NPLs and NPLs from
banks recapitalized by AMCON
Non-margin NPLs

12/28/2011

885

515

41.8%

Systemically important

4,020

1,759

56.2%

12/31/2010

Total

Discount

Notes

Source: Makanjuola 2015, 103.
The rapid execution of the margin loan purchase can be explained by the fact that the
valuation of collateral for loans secured by publicly traded shares is simpler than that for
other secured NPLs. The subsequent valuation of NPLs not secured by shares required
considerably more time and resources. AMCON’s last acquisition consisted of “eligible assets
which were not necessarily NPLs.” Among these assets were systemically important loans to
the oil and gas sector purchased from commercial banks at a 5% to 15% discount (Cerruti
and Neyens 2016).
Although nearly every financial institution in Nigeria participated in asset transfers,
AMCON’s portfolio was dominated by assets acquired from a small number of sellers as well
as a small number of loans with large face value. In total, AMCON purchased 12,537
individual loans from 22 financial institutions with the five largest sellers accounting for
58% of AMCON’s portfolio; it purchased just 20% of the total from the 12 smallest sellers.7
Among the loans purchased, 19.87%, or 2,491 loans with face value above ₦100 million,
represented 93% of AMCON’s total portfolio. A breakdown of AMCON’s portfolio by
participating institution is provided in Figure 3 (AMCON, n.d.). Through its operations,
AMCON successfully reduced the NPL ratio in the banking sector to 5.8% from its peak of
37.3% in 2009 (IMF 2007–2019; Cerruti and Neyens 2016).

AMCON ultimately recapitalized eight of these institutions, including the five largest. See Ungersboeck and
Runkel (2021).
7
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Figure 3: AMCON’s NPL Portfolio by Participating Institution

Source: AMCON, n.d.
AMCON’s public accounts were issued at the end of its first year of operations. The
statements reveal a negative equity position of ₦2.36 trillion. The losses are largely unrelated
to AMCON’s loan acquisition operations and can be attributed to write-downs on the equity
AMCON took in recapitalized banks (AMCON 2012). AMCON’s negative equity increased to
₦3.19 trillion in its 2012 financial statements and ₦3.3 trillion in 20138 (AMCON 2013).
AMCON’s negative equity position raised the question of whether the public would have to
eventually carry the financial burden of losses arising from the agency’s operations
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2012b). The concern was especially relevant at the time, given
that 30% of the zero-coupon bonds AMCON issued to fund its purchases were repayable at
the end of 2013 (AMCON 2013).
To address the situation and support AMCON in its recovery efforts, the CBN barred 113
firms who were unable to fulfill their debt obligations towards AMCON from accessing
further credit until they repaid their debts. The decision was criticized by analysts, since
cutting these firms off from available liquidity would only increase the risk that the firms
would fail to repay any of the debts they owed (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012a). As of
8 AMCON switched to IFRS reporting in 2013. Previous

financial statements were prepared “in accordance with
local generally accepted accounting principles” (AMCON 2013).
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2013, AMCON reported its intention to repay holders of the zero-coupon bonds with cash
and liquid instruments at the bonds’ maturity date in December 2013, claiming it would be
able to retire ₦2 trillion of its bonds during 2013 and 2014 (Economist Intelligence Unit
2013). These positive developments were attributed to the fact that participating banks
honored their commitment to the Resolution Cost Fund, providing AMCON with substantial
financial support (Economist Intelligence Unit 2013). However, given the magnitude of
AMCON’s asset purchase and recapitalization operations, the ₦1.5 trillion provided by the
Resolution Cost Fund may have covered the agency’s losses on NPLs without compensating
for AMCON’s losses from its recapitalization efforts. As of February 2021, AMCON still
carried ₦4.4 trillion of debt (Akinloye 2021).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a Package: AMCON’s asset purchases were part of a policy package that
included the recapitalization of banks.
AMCON’s mandate was broader than asset management. AMCON’s operations included the
recapitalization of illiquid or insolvent banks (Ungersboeck and Runkel 2021; Makanjuola
2015). Many other countries split the asset management and recapitalization functions into
different organizations. The government established AMCON after previous measures to
strengthen the financial system, including the CBN’s purchase of ₦620 billion of
subordinated debt in eight banks in 2009 failed to fully stabilize ailing banks (Cerruti and
Neyens 2016).
2. Legal Authority: AMCON was established under the AMCON Act, approved by the
Nigerian legislature, and signed into law on July 19, 2010.
A first draft of the AMCON Act was forwarded to the Senate in November 2004 as a part of
the measures taken to strengthen the financial sector. At the time, the proposal encountered
strong pushback from opponents of the banking consolidation agenda and did not gain the
necessary traction. The idea was revived in 2009 following a special examination of Nigerian
banks, focusing policymakers’ attention on the fragility of the domestic banking sector. A
first public hearing on the bill was held at the House of Representatives on January 28, 2010.
After a second reading, the House enacted the bill on March 10, 2010. The Nigerian Senate
passed the bill on May 5, 2010. President Goodluck Jonathan signed the AMCON Act into law
on July 19, 2010 (Makanjuola 2015). Among other functions, the Act empowered the agency
to “acquire eligible bank assets [EBAs] from eligible financial institutions” (AMCON Act
2010).
3. Special Powers: To support recovery efforts, the government granted AMCON
special debt restructuring and collection powers.
The original act had provided powers to seize debtor collateral, freeze their funds, and apply
to courts to take possession of a debtor’s property. AMCON could also petition courts to
invoke bankruptcy proceedings regardless of the debtor’s solvency in an effort to recover
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assets from a debtor. To bolster AMCON’s rights, the Act (2010) imposed penalties on those
who lied about loans and collateral owed to AMCON.
Nigeria’s legislature ultimately concluded these powers were insufficient. It passed
amendments to the AMCON Act in 2015 and 2019 to enhance the agency’s legal powers and
obtain payments from recalcitrant debtors (Berkeley Legal 2019). With the first amendment
in 2015, AMCON’s power to seize assets was extended to enable it to seize any of a debtors’
assets. The initial act limited its ability to seize collateral pledged against an eligible bank
asset (AMCON Act Amendment 2015). In 2019 a new amendment further expanded these
special powers. Under the act, AMCON now had the power to access debtors’ bank
information to gain access to all available funds. The agency was also empowered to publish
the names of non-cooperative debtors (AAA Chambers 2019).
4. Mandate: Within asset management, AMCON’s mandate was to maximize returns.
The AMCON Act charged the corporation to “obtain the best achievable financial returns on
eligible bank assets” and to protect the value of those assets in the interest of AMCON
(AMCON Act 2010). This could include investing in assets other than NPLs to support
AMCON’s functions.
5. Communication: Documents surveyed did not suggest AMCON’s communication
strategy.
No documents indicated how AMCON designed or implemented its communication strategy.
AMCON remained a focus of the press through at least its first 11 years (See, for example,
Akinloye 2021; Benson 2020; Osae-Brown 2019; Wall 2014).
6. Ownership Structure: The CBN and Ministry of Finance split ownership of AMCON.
AMCON was fully owned by the federal government with its ₦10 billion capital split evenly
between the Ministry of Finance and the CBN (Makanjuola 2015). The cash helped cover
AMCON’s initial operating costs (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
7. Governance/Administration: Prior to the start of AMCON’s operations, the AMCON
Implementation Committee (AMCON-IC) devised a work plan for the establishment
of the agency.
The AMCON-IC met on 6 occasions between May and August 2010. As many as 30 people
attended meetings. During the first meeting, participants included management consultants
and legal and financial advisers, experts from the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Deutsche Bank, Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc, Chapel Hill Advisory Partners
Limited, Olaniwun Ajayi LP, Kola Awodein & Co, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Subsequent
meetings saw the addition of participants representing various Nigerian and international
institutions including the Ministry of Finance, the Debt Management Office (DMO), the
[Nigerian] Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the International Monetary Fund.
The work plan devised by the committee included, among other items, staff recruitment,
securing office locations, determining a valuation methodology for NPLs, and exploring
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funding options for AMCON. The draft bill establishing AMCON was modeled after Ireland’s
National Asset Management Agency and Malaysia’s Danaharta. These agencies were
mandated to acquire NPLs during the GFC and the Asian Financial Crisis, respectively
(Makanjuola 2015).
8. Governance/Administration: AMCON was governed by a 10-member board of
directors.
AMCON’s board of directors consisted of four executive directors and six non-executive
members (AMCON Act 20100). The Nigerian Senate approved the 10 nominees on November
3, 2010. The board was led by Mustafa Chike-Obi as AMCON’s CEO. The CBN had considerable
power over the board, as it nominated all four executive directors, including the CEO, as well
as two non-executive members, for a total of six nominations. The Ministry of Finance
nominated three non-executive members, including the chairman of the board, while the last
nominee was nominated by the NDIC (Makanjuola 2015; Cerruti and Neyens 2016). All
directors were nominated for five-year terms with a possible reappointment to a second
five-year term (Makanjuola 2015). The AMCON Act further specified that board members
should have at least “10 years [of] cognate financial experience at a senior management level,
. . . . have no conflict of interest with AMCON’s business, and disclose debt obligations and
interest” (Makanjuola 2015; Cerruti and Neyens 2016; AMCON Act 2010).
9. Size: AMCON had no predetermined size limitations on asset purchases.
No documents reviewed indicate that AMCON was subject to an upper limit on asset
purchases. However, regulators encouraged a minimum level of AMCON purchases by
requiring banks to reduce toxic assets. Since foreign participation in the banking sector was
small, domestic banks faced few possible buyers other than AMCON.
10. Funding Source: AMCON issued government-guaranteed, zero-coupon bonds in
exchange for eligible assets but ultimately covered its losses on debt recovery by
creating a ₦1.5 trillion sinking fund financed through contributions by Nigerian
financial institutions and the Central Bank of Nigeria.
The bonds were issued in five series between December 31, 2010 and December 28, 2011.
Figure 4 provides an overview of AMCON’s bond issuances. AMCON first funded EBA
purchases before issuing bonds for its recapitalization program. While AMCON managed to
retire about a third of its bonds by 2014, the remainder were refinanced by the CBN. The
arrangement provided that the CBN invested ₦3.6 trillion in AMCON bonds to refinance the
agency’s exposure (Mazen 2013).9
Then, in January 2011, the CBN and 24 Nigerian banks signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) to create the Resolution Cost Fund (RCF). Initially, eligible financial
institutions were required to make an annual contribution of 30 basis points of their assets.
The contributions were estimated to generate ₦100 billion every year (Makanjuola 2015),
Further details on the use of AMCON bonds in credit operations with the CBN can be found in the relevant
guidelines issued by the CBN.
9
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and AMCON projected in 2011 that the RCF would produce the majority of AMCON revenues
(AMCON 2012). To facilitate banking-sector contributions given liquidity constraints, the
NDIC could decrease the insurance premium it charged banks. The CBN contributed ₦50
billion per year (Makanjuola 2015). Contributions were to be collected for a period of 10
years, with banking-sector and CBN contributions capped at ₦1 trillion and ₦500 billion,
respectively, for a total fund size of ₦1.5 trillion (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
The federal government guaranteed all losses incurred during AMCON’s operations that
could not be covered by either the RCF or revenues from asset resolution. In the event that
AMCON’s operations produced a surplus, it was to be shared on a pro-rata basis among banks
contributing to the RCF (Makanjuola 2015).
In 2013 the IMF recommended that the RCF MoU be codified (Chew and Dijkman 2013). This
was achieved in 2015 when the RCF was introduced into the AMCON Act through an
amendment. The amendment formalized the bank levy and increased it from 30 to 50 basis
points of total assets for each eligible financial institution. The CBN’s contribution was set to
₦50 billion as initially decided (AMCON Amendment 2015). The increase in banks’
contribution was justified by a desire to collect quickly in order to wind down AMCON’s
operations (Wallace 2015). Regulators shared representation on the RCF’s board with a
rotating slate of member banks (Makanjuola 2015).

Figure 4: A Breakdown of AMCON Bond Issuances

Source: AMCON 2012, 33.
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11. Eligible Institutions: All banks in Nigeria could participate, but CBN guidelines
effectively required participation for domestic institutions by imposing an upper
bound on all banks’ eligible asset holdings.
Any bank in Nigeria was eligible to participate in AMCON’s NPL transfer operations. In total,
22 banks sold some of their NPLs to AMCON. Individual banks’ contributions to the agency’s
portfolio ranged from 0.13% to 14.62%. A comprehensive list of participating institutions
and their contribution to the total portfolio is provided in Figure 3 (AMCON Guidelines 2010;
AMCON n.d.).
The CBN mandated that institutions decrease to below 5% the fraction of assets held that
were classified as eligible bank assets. Some of these institutions, including the largest
participants in the asset purchase program, later received capital injections from AMCON.
Per the guidelines, “no Eligible Financial Institutions shall hold on its books Eligible Bank
Assets with an aggregate Book Value exceeding five percent of the Book Value of its existing
loan portfolio”. The threshold was effective from February 16, 2011, three months after the
entry into force of the guidelines. From then on, banks whose asset holdings did not comply
with the guidelines had 30 days to submit an offer to sell to AMCON. The CBN mandated that
such an offer to sell should include “a full listing of all Eligible Bank Assets of the Eligible
Financial Institution and [their] corresponding book value” (AMCON Guidelines). It is not
known whether any bank sold assets beyond those required to reduce their percentage of
EBAs to less than 5%. Twenty-two institutions transferred at least some share of their NPLs
to AMCON. These included 21 domestic banks and the foreign-owned Stanbic IBTC. While
Stanbic IBTC initially avoided participation, it eventually transferred 12 loans to AMCON,
representing 0.13% of the agency’s portfolio. Two other foreign-owned institutions,
Citigroup and Standard Chartered Bank, avoided participation in the program, though their
reasons were not publicized.
12. Eligible Assets: Eligible assets were defined by a set of guidelines issued to AMCON
by the CBN and focused on nonperforming assets or loans classified as substandard
and below.
The “Guidelines for the Operation of Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria” issued for
AMCON by the CBN laid out 5 categories of EBAs (AMCON Guidelines):
(i)

“Collateralized loans classified as substandard and below (secured NPLs);

(ii)

Unsecured loans classified as substandard and below (unsecured NPLs);

(iii)

Loans owed to eligible institutions whose banking license has been revoked by
the CBN;

(iv)

Collateral seized by an eligible institution while collecting on debt it is owed;
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Loans that “pose significant risk to an eligible institution.”10

In practice, acquisitions mainly consisted of credit extended to the oil and gas sector, margin
loans, and mortgage debt (AMCON n.d.). The energy-sector credit fell under the category of
loans that posed significant risk without being classified as NPLs (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
AMCON declared that these loans, while classified as performing, “were too large given the
lender’s capital base and could pose a systemic risk to the banking system” (Makanjuola
2015). The purchase appeared to critics to be a political gesture, “because one of the debtors
was owned by the minister of power” (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). In addition to the asset
categories mentioned, the CBN reserved the right to extend the definition to other types of
assets.
13. Acquisition - Mechanics: Before agreeing on terms of transfer, interested eligible
financial institutions submitted a complete list of eligible bank assets to AMCON.
Before an eligible institution entered into a transfer agreement with AMCON, either because
it wanted to transfer eligible assets or because it was required to in order to meet the
mandated threshold, it submitted a sale offer (AMCON Guidelines). In the offer, the selling
bank included its eligible bank assets and credit information relevant to the assets (AMCON
Act 2010). Following the asset valuation, the parties entered a sale and purchase agreement
in writing (AMCON Guidelines; AMCON Act 2010).
14. Acquisition - Pricing: The valuation process for secured loans was tied to collateral
value, which was appraised according to AMCON-wide standards.
The valuation of eligible assets was based on a set of guidelines issued by the CBN. Secured
loans were valued based on collateral while unsecured loans were acquired at 5% of face
value. The CBN provided detailed guidelines on three types of collateralized loans:
(i)

Loans secured by real estate:
The selling institution provided a good faith valuation of the forced-sale and openmarket value of the property. The average of both values was adopted as
acquisition price. This price was subject to a revaluation performed within 12
months of the purchase by a real estate appraiser jointly appointed by the seller
and AMCON. In the case of an overvaluation, the seller was required to pay the
difference and a penalty equal to 10% of the difference to AMCON. If the property
was initially undervalued, the difference was paid to the seller without penalty.
The revaluation option was abandoned for purchases occurring after February 16,
2011, as the initial price was directly determined by a jointly appointed third
party.

Significant risk was defined as a reasonable expectation that the loan will be reclassified as substandard or
below within the next three months or may result in a loss at least equal to 1% of an institution’s total assets
within the next six months (AMCON Guidelines, 7).
10
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Loans secured by listed shares:
These loans were valued at the 60-day moving average of the price of the security
offered as collateral measured from November 15, 2010, and augmented by a 60%
premium. If the resulting valuation was below 5% of the principal, the loan would
be valued at 5% of the principal sum.

(iii)

Loans secured by unlisted shares
The purchase price was based on the valuation of the unlisted share as estimated
using the average of three different pricing methodologies and guided by the
latest audited financials (AMCON Guidelines).11

15. Management and Disposal: Asset disposal focused on debt collection and employed
asset freezes and credit sanctions on bad debtors.
AMCON’s recovery efforts mainly focused on debt collection given that a large amount of the
total debt owed to AMCON could be traced back to a small number of individuals (OsaeBrown 2019). AMCON also wielded its special right to name major non-cooperative debtors.
This strategy built on previous attempts by Nigerian regulators to pressure debtors, such as
the CBN’s prohibition on 113 companies from accessing credit lines in 2013 or its publication
of 105 of AMCON’s biggest debtors in 2018 (TheCable 2018). The government augmented
AMCON’s debt-collection powers because it and its debt recovery partners12 faced serious
difficulties in the recovery process, specifically while liquidating properties. Major issues
included debtors’ intervention to slow down the judicial process and prevent liquidation,
AMCON’s inability to trace the property of debtors, and initial overvaluations of properties
(Abasiekong and Oyewo 2019). An amendment to the AMCON Act that allowed AMCON to
inspect and freeze debtor bank accounts worked to address these last critiques (AAA
Chambers 2019). AMCON also pressured debtors by the seizure—and threat of seizure—of
debtor collateral using powers granted by the 2015 amendment to the AMCON Act.
16. Timeframe: AMCON’s asset disposal operations lacked a clear timeline.
The 2015 amendment to the AMCON Act specified a 2019 end date for the corporation.
However, the 2019 amendment lacked such specification. Nigerian media expected
liquidation to come in 2023 or 2024 (Benson 2020), though the IMF (2019) refuted this idea,
since AMCON had just issued 25-year bonds. The IMF criticized AMCON for its lack of an
explicit exit strategy. The Fund recognized the agency’s contribution in restoring stability in
the banking sector. However, it voiced concerns regarding the absence of a sunset provision
for AMCON’s activities. In a 2012 report the Fund recommended that a “credible exit strategy
[should be] devised to ensure a smooth winding up of its operations by end–2017.” An
The methodologies included (i) net asset value, (ii) comparing the average price-earnings ratio with ratios
of shares in similar sectors or industry, and (iii) a valuation based on transactions in similar sectors or
industries.
12 The AMCON Guidelines provide for the possibility of appointing third-party asset managers to assist the
agency in the management of eligible bank assets (AMCON Guidelines).
11
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explicit sunset date was seen as “important to minimize fiscal risks and avoid potential moral
hazard behavior by the banks” (IMF 2013). The Fund reiterated its criticism in a 2019 report
claiming that “an exit strategy for the state-backed asset management company (AMCON) is
urgently needed.” However, some of this concern was related to AMCON’s continued
recapitalization efforts, such as injection into Skye Bank, which had participated in AMCON’s
asset purchase program. The Fund recommended “that AMCON . . . formally sets a sunset to
its existence, earmarks its cash flows to buy back bonds, sets annual disposal targets,
implements a plan to divest AMCON’s interests in companies and banks, improves its legal
power to recover assets, and is gradually phased out” (IMF 2019).

III. Evaluation
AMCON’s loan purchase operations achieved their stated goal of reducing the NPL level in
the Nigerian banking sector (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). However, the agency has faced
criticism related to its governance structure and operations.
AMCON successfully tackled the NPL level by absorbing nonperforming assets from 22 of the
24 banks (Central Bank of Nigeria 2010) in the country. As a result, the NPL ratio fell from
its peak at 37.3% in 2009 to 5.8% by 2011 (IMF 2007–2019). By 2014, AMCON’s actions
“resulted in a cleanup and stabilization of the banking system,” having pushed the baseline
capital adequacy ratio to 17% and the NPL ratio to less than 3% (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
On the operational side, criticism focused on the guidelines issued by the CBN. Critics raised
concerns regarding the central bank’s decision to limit the scope of AMCON’s activities to
deposit money banks. In particular, the exclusion of the microfinance sector “question[ed]
the CBN’s claim that its intervention was [intended] to protect depositors and creditors and
prevent losses” (Osuji 2012).
Observers also highlighted the fact that “the CBN [could] declare any class of bank assets
eligible” providing it with “a power that appear[ed] unrestricted” (Osuji 2012). Overall, it
was noted that the CBN had substantial power over AMCON’s decision making and that
“AMCON is practically an arm of the CBN” (Osuji 2012; Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Last,
AMCON’s statutory “focus on warehousing and management of assets” was thought to
compromise its goal of achieving rapid market normalization (Osuji 2012).
The CBN’s influence also reflected on AMCON’s governance. Beyond serving as the agency’s
main supervisory authority and shareholder, the central bank nominated all four executive
members of the board of directors, including the chief executive. Given that experience
shows independence to be an important factor in an asset management company’s success,
critics raised the question of whether “these powers [compromised] its mission of attaining
financial stability” (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The issues related to AMCON’s independence
were further exacerbated due to concerns regarding AMCON’s ability to conduct its
operations. One source notes that “AMCON apparently lack[ed] persons with specialist skills
including credit and transaction risk management” (Osuji 2012).
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The IMF also voiced concerns regarding the eventual allocation of losses from AMCON’s loan
purchases and bank recapitalization activities. By 2014, AMCON’s accounts showed a
negative equity position of ₦3.6 trillion (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The resulting debt was
initially designed to be paid first from the proceeds of asset sales, with any remaining balance
to be repaid out of the Banking Sector Resolution Cost Fund. In 2015, AMCON announced
that it had recovered 57% of its eligible asset portfolio for a total of ₦1 trillion in recovered
funds (Wallace 2015). However, it maintains a large amount of NPLs on its balance sheet and
further losses accumulated from its bank recapitalization operations. Given the ₦1.5 trillion
ceiling on the RCF, it appears that a large share of the losses will eventually be borne by the
government (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).

IV.
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